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t the beginning of the financial crisis, it was said that banks were “international in 
life, but national in death”. At the time (2008-09), large international banks had to be 
rescued  by  the  government  of  their  home  country  when  they  ran  into  trouble. 
However,  in  Europe  today,  the  problem  is  the  opposite:  banks  are  “national  in  life,  but 
European in death”.  
In Spain, for example, the problem arises at the national level, where local savings banks 
(called ‘cajas’) financed an outsized real estate boom. As the boom turned to bust, the losses 
threaten to overwhelm the capacity of the Spanish state, and the problem becomes European, 
as it threatens the very survival of the euro. 
The Spanish case is symptomatic of a larger problem: national supervisors have always a 
tendency to minimize problems on their own turf. In the case of large international banking 
groups, the instinct (and the bureaucratic self-interest) of the home country supervisors is to 
defend  their  ‘national  champion’  abroad.  But  the  resistance  of  national  supervisors  to 
recognize any general problem at home is even stronger. This has become apparent again in 
Spain where the authorities have until very recently maintained that the problems in the real 
estate sector were temporary. If they were to admit reality, they would have to disqualify 
themselves because they would then have to confess that they had overlooked for years the 
build-up  of  a  huge  construction  boom  whose  bust  now  threatens  to  bankrupt  the  entire 
nation.  In  the  case  of  Ireland,  the  situation  was  initially  not  much  different:  when  the 
problems first started to surface, the finance minister glibly exclaimed that this would be 
“the cheapest bank rescue ever”. 
Given this predictable tendency of national supervisors not to recognize problems at home, it 
seemed natural that the cost of cleaning up insolvent banks should also be borne at the 
national  level.  At  first  sight  it  thus  made  sense  that  even  in  the  euro  area  banking 
supervision remained largely national, with only some loose coordination at the EU level. A 
European Banking Authority (EBA) was recently created, but it has only very limited powers 
over national supervisors whose daily work remains guided by national considerations. 
But recent developments have shown that this approach, i.e. ‘national problem and hence 
national  responsibility  for  cleaning  up’,  is  not  tenable.  The  problems  might  arise  at  the 
national level, but they quickly threaten the stability of the entire system.  
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The need to rectify this situation has now finally been recognized by Europe’s leaders who 
decided at their last summit that the responsibility for banking supervision in the euro area 
should be transferred to the European Central Bank. They naturally put the ECB in charge 
given that the integration of the financial system is particularly strong within the euro area. 
Moreover, the ECB is already de facto responsible for the stability of the euro area’s banking 
system. But at present it has to lend massive amounts to banks without being able to judge 
their solidity because all the detailed information about the health of the banks is still in the 
hands of national authorities who guard this information jealously and have every tendency 
to pretend that there is no problem until it is too late. The ECB already de facto started to 
assume some supervisory power in a little-noticed step when it announced that government-
guaranteed bank bonds would be accepted as collateral for new lending only if the bank 
draws up a funding plan indicating how it will be able to finance its operations without 
excessive recourse to the ECB. 
Putting the ECB in charge would also help to stop the creeping disintegration process which 
is  not  publicly  visible,  but  nevertheless  very  real. There  are  several  cases  of  large 
international  banking  groups  headquartered  in  countries  that  today  are  under  financial 
stress.  These  groups  are  being  torn  apart  by  the  conflicting  pressures  from  national 
supervisors.  Consider  the  case  of  a  bank  headquartered  in  Italy,  but  with  an  important 
subsidiary in Germany. The German operations naturally generate a surplus of funds (given 
that  savings  in  Germany  on  average  far  exceed  investment).  The  parent  bank  would  of 
course  like  to  use  these  funds  to  reinforce  the  liquidity  of  the  group.  But  the  German 
supervisory authorities consider Italy at risk and thus oppose any transfer of funds from the 
German subsidiary to the Italian headquarters. The supervisor of the home country (Italy) 
has of course the opposite interest. It would like to see the ‘internal capital’ market operate as 
fully as possible. Here again it makes sense to have an institution in charge that is neutral 
with respect to these competing interests, like the ECB. 
Putting the ECB in charge of banking supervision thus solves one problem. But it creates 
another: Can one still hold national authorities responsible for saving banks that they no 
longer supervise? The report of the de Larosière group,1 which in 2009 became the basis for 
the creation of the EBA and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), argued that the ECB 
should not be involved in ‘micro’ supervision mainly because banking rescue and resolution 
involves taxpayers’ money, which they assumed had to be national. 
Economic (and political) logic thus requires that the euro area will soon need also a common 
bank rescue fund. Officially this is not yet fully acknowledged, except for a hint in the Euro 
Area  summit  statement  of  June  28-29th,  which  says  that  once  a  system  of  supervision 
involving the ECB has been created, it would become possible for the permanent rescue 
fund, the ESM, to inject capital into banks. European integration has often proceeded in this 
incremental  fashion:  an  incomplete  step  in  one  area  later  requires  further  integration  in 
related areas. This method has worked well in the past: indeed, the European Union of today 
is the result of such a process. But a financial crisis does not give national leaders the time 
they used to have to explain to their electorates why one step required another. They will 
have to walk much more quickly if they have any hope of saving the euro.  
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